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s had been forewarned, the immediate effect of Operation Allied
Force, which was in fact directed against targets in Serbia as well as
Kosovo province, was an increase in the terror directed against the Muslim Albanian population. While NATO claimed that only military targets were being
attacked, it soon became clear that civilians and civilian objects were suffering
damage—sometimes because of “clever” bombs going astray but also, it seems,
from NATO’s desire to avoid casualties among its own personnel, which led to
aircraft flying beyond anti-aircraft range resulting in mistakes in targeting.
Cluster bombs, the range of which is difficult or impossible to control, were
among the ordinance dropped rendering civilian casualties virtually inevitable.
While it was claimed that bridges over the Danube, television studios and electricity-generating establishments were legitimate military objectives, questions
regarding the rule of proportionality in relation to collateral damage, both under customary law and Protocols I and II, have to be examined.
The Economist Intelligence Unit reported, perhaps in the light of more
recent developments with some exaggeration, that the NATO bombing
“inflicted enormous damage on Yugoslavia’s economy and infrastructure. . . . Yugoslavia will sink below Albania and become the poorest country
in Europe.”1 The Secretary General of the United Nations stated in a press release of April 28, 1999:
The civilian death toll is rising, as is the number of displaced. There is increasing
devastation to the country’s infrastructure, and huge damage to [its] economy.
For example, Mr. Sommarugua [President of the International Committee of
1. Globe and Mail (Toronto), 23 August 1999.
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the Red Cross after visiting Yugoslavia] told me that the destruction of the three
bridges in Novi Sad also cut off the fresh water supply to half of that city’s
population of 90,000 people.2

No fewer than 350 cluster bomb attacks were launched against Serb forces
(it was later discovered that NATO claims of destruction of Serb tanks and
other military installations were unrealistic) and:
[O]fficially it is acknowledged that between five and ten per cent of the bombs
would have failed to detonate, although unofficial estimates put it
higher. . . . Although the civilian casualty toll from incidents involving
unexploded munitions has dropped from five a day in the first month after the
air campaign ended to the present one or two a day Lt. Col. Flanagan
[Australian program manager of the United Nations mine action coordinate
center in Pristina] said he needed NATO’s help to meet the challenge of
making Kosovo safe for the population, especially in rural areas, ‘Any help we
could get from NATO would be appreciated, but at the moment KFOR
[Kosovo Protection Force] is not addressing the problem unless there is an
emergency humanitarian or operational reason’. He said ‘children were being
maimed because the cluster bombs looked like toys and were extremely
sensitive. If you pick up a cluster bomb it will explode, it is even more dangerous
than a mine. Anything can detonate a cluster bomb’. Colonel Flanagan said
NATO had supplied the coordinates for the cluster bomb attacks which had
helped his teams to trace some of the unexploded bomblets. However, not all
the coordinates had proved accurate.3

Given the nature of this statement, one is inclined to enquire whether it did
not embarrass those participants in the NATO campaign which were parties
to Protocol II as amended4 of the 1990 Conventional Weapons Convention.5
2. Statement by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on Kosovo Crisis, Press Release SG/SM/6972,
Apr. 28, 1999, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/Kosovo334.htm. For a
breakdown of the damage done to Yugoslavia’s economy, see Ved Nanda, Legal Implications of
NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF
CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR L.C. GREEN ON THE OCCASION OF HIS
EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 313, 319 (M. Schmitt ed., 2000)(Vol. 75, US Naval War College
International Law Studies).
3. Michael Evans, NATO Bombs Still Killing Kosovars, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 16, 1999.
4. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices, adopted May 3, 1996, 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1206, 1209 (1996).
5. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excesively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, adopted
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 179 (D.
Schindler and J. Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988). The unamended Protocol II is at 185.
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While NATO certainly did not use booby-traps, Colonel Flanagan’s description of cluster bombs as “toy-like and attractive to children” brings them very
close to the definition of such weapons: “any device or material which is designed, constructed, or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object
or performs an apparently safe act.”6
Colonel Flanagan also expressed some criticism of NATO’s unwillingness
to assist in clearing these weapons which again draws attention to the Protocol and its obligation to give notice of a minefield and arrange for its
clearance:
1.

Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields, mined
areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices shall be cleared, removed,
destroyed. . . .

2.

High Contracting Parties and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility
with respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other
devices in areas under their control.

3.

With respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other
devices laid by a party in areas over which it no longer exercises control,
such party shall provide to the party in control of the area . . . to the extent
permitted by such party, technical and material assistance necessary to
fulfill such responsibility.7

For the main part, KFOR and those members of NATO contributing thereto
remained in control of most of Kosovo and would appear, at least at the time of
Colonel Flanagan’s remarks, as not being as cooperative as some of them are obligated to be. Finally, it may be asked whether by using weapons coated in depleted
uranium there has not been a breach of the basic principle of customary law that
weapons likely to cause unnecessary suffering may not be used, while for parties to
Protocol I8 there would appear to have been also a breach of Article 35, which
forbids “methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment” (emphasis
added) as such usage must have envisaged.
As has been pointed out, the bombing campaign was not as successful as
NATO might have hoped. It extended over seventy-eight days and at no time
6. Id., art. 2(4).
7. Id., art. 10.
8. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
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was there any contact between ground troops and no fatalities were suffered
by NATO air personnel. Since the aerial campaign was affected by weather
conditions as well as the accuracy of the crews, observation of targets was
sometimes difficult.9 While the United States was not a party to Protocol I,
both Canada and the United Kingdom were. It is therefore necessary as regards these participants to refer to the relevant Articles of that instrument. It
should also be noted that in so far as the United States was concerned it was
under the customary law obligation to confine its offensive activities to military and not civilian targets. In accordance with Protocol I:
Article 48 - Basic rule
[T]he Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.
Article 51 - Protection of the civilian population
1.

The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations.

....
3.

The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threat of violence the primary purpose of which
is to spread terror among the civilian population is prohibited.

There has never been any suggestion that NATO operations were in any way
directed at causing terror, but NATO never concealed that there was inherent
in its policy an intention to create a situation in which the Yugoslav population
would be so discomforted as to rise up and overthrow the government seated in
Belgrade. This eventually occurred but not as a direct consequence of the
bombing campaign.
Article 51 continues:
4.

Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or

9. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 2, at 319.
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(c) those which are employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each case, are of a nature to strike military objectives
and civilian objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
5.

Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area
containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive10 in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.

Article 52 - General protection of civilian objects
....
2.

Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

3.

In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian
purposes . . . is being used to make an effective contribution to military
action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.

In the case of the bombing campaign undertaken by NATO, it would often appear, prima facie, that the question may also be asked whether the distinction
demanded by Protocol I of those States which were parties to it was always
respected.
Perhaps one of the clearest instances of acceptance of ethical principles in
modern international law is that which governs the punishment of those
guilty of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. To the extent
that Serbian or Kosovar Albanians committed any of these offenses, they must
answer at a trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
10. See, e.g., William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare,
98 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 91 (1982).
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) established by the United Nations. The ICTY has no dies
ad quem and so enjoys jurisdiction until it is declared functus officio or there is a
clear statement that conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia has
come to an end. Prima facie, members of the NATO forces who may have
committed offenses against the law of armed conflict are as amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal as are any other offenders. In fact, the ICTY established a committee to investigate this issue, which, concluded that no further
investigation was necessary and no attempt has been made to indict any
NATO personnel.11
Since the operation was essentially aerial, the ambit subject to the law of
armed conflict was somewhat limited. The provision of Protocol I defining
grave breaches is almost certainly an expression of the customary law with regard to protection of civilians and so is not confined solely to parties to the
Protocol. However, that instrument’s language is specific:
3.

[T]he following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol,
when committed willfully . . . and causing death or serious injury to body or
health:
(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of
attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or
civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive
loss of life, injury to civilians or danger to civilian objects. . . . 12

One English newspaper report lends support to the argument that such
breaches did occur: “So wild was the bombing that ministers found themselves
having to call journalists, make-up girls, hospital staff and even whole villages
‘legitimate targets of war’, blithely rewriting the Geneva Convention to suit
themselves.”13
There can be no doubt that if the rule of law or ethical standards are to
prevail in the future, it is essential that the law concerning war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity be attached to all individuals, military, political or civilian, and not merely to those against whom “we” are taking
action. As has been mentioned a committee established by the ICTY Office of
11. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, reprinted in 39
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1257 (2000), and reprinted herein as Appendix A
[hereinafter Report to the Prosecutor].
12. Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 85 (3)(a) and (b).
13. Simon Jenkins, A Victory for Cowards , THE TIMES (London), June 11, 1999.
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the Prosecutor (OTP) in accordance with Article 18 of its Statute14 did investigate allegations lodged against NATO. Some of its comments bear reproduction. As regards the legality of the NATO recourse to force without
United Nations sanction, the Report states
[T]he jus ad bellum regulates when states may use force and is, for the most part,
enshrined in the UN Charter. In general, states may use force in self defence
(individual or collective) and for very few other purposes. In particular, the
legitimacy of the presumed basis for the NATO bombing campaign,
humanitarian intervention, without prior Security Council authorization, is
hotly debated. That being said . . . the crime related to an unlawful decision to
use force is the crime against peace or aggression. While a person convicted of a
crime against peace may, potentially, be held criminally responsible for all of the
activities causing death, injury or destruction during a conflict, the ICTY does
not have jurisdiction over crimes against peace.15

Consequently, the Report was confined to examining only allegations that
NATO might have committed acts contrary to the jus in bello.
In so far as it was alleged that the use of depleted uranium (DU) constituted
a breach of the law of armed conflict, the Report stated:
There is no specific treaty ban on the use of DU projectiles. There is a
developing scientific debate and concern expressed regarding the impact of the
use of such projectiles and it is possible that, in future, there will be a consensus
view in international legal circles that use of such projectiles violate general
principles of the law applicable to use of weapons in armed conflict. No such
consensus exists at present. . . . It is acknowledged that the underlying principles
of the law of armed conflict such as proportionality are applicable in this
context; however it is the committee’s view . . . based on information available
at present, that the OTP should not commence an investigation into use of
depleted uranium projectiles by NATO.16

A similar hesitancy to condemn the use of cluster bombs is to be found in
the Report.
14. “The Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis of information obtained
from any source, particularly from Governments, United Nations organs, intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations. The Prosecutor shall assess the information received or
obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed.” S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993),
U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 36-40 (1993), reprinted in 32 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1165,
1192 (1993).
15. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, ¶ 30.
16. Id., ¶ 26.
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There is no specific treaty provision which prohibits or restricts the use of cluster
bombs, although, of course, cluster bombs must be in compliance with the
general principles applicable to the use of all weapons. Human Rights Watch
[which had submitted documentary evidence concerning alleged NATO
offences] has condemned the use of cluster bombs alleging that the high ‘dud’ or
failure rate of the submunitions (bomblets) contained inside cluster bombs
converts these submunitions into antipersonnel landmines which it asserts, are
now prohibited under customary international law. Whether antipersonnel
landmines are prohibited under current customary international law is
debatable, although there is a strong trend in that direction. There is, however,
no general legal consensus that cluster bombs are, in legal terms, equivalent to
antipersonnel landmines . . . . It is the opinion of the committee, based on
information presently available, that the OTP should not commence an
investigation into use of cluster bombs as such by NATO.17

While it was hesitant to condemn the use of particular weaponry, the committee did make some general comments concerning legal issues relating to
target selection. Here we may detect some hints of a commander’s responsibility to have concern for ethical principles.
[I]n combat, military commanders are required a) to direct their operations
against military objectives, and b) when directing their operations against
military objectives, to ensure that the losses to the civilian population and the
damage to civilian property are not disproportionate to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated. Attacks which are not directed against military
objectives (particularly attacks directed against the civilian population) and
attacks which cause disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property
damage may constitute the actus reus for the offence under Article 3 of the ICTY
Statute.18 The mens rea for the offence is intention or recklessness, not simple
negligence. In determining whether or not the mens rea requirement has been
met, it should be borne in mind that commanders deciding on an attack have
duties:
(a) to do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are military objectives,
(b) to take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and means
of warfare with a view to avoiding or, in any event to minimizing
incidental civilian casualties or civilian property damage, and

17. Id., ¶ 27.
18. Concerning violations of the laws or customs of war.
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(c) to refrain from launching attacks which may be expected to cause
disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.
One of the principles underlying international humanitarian law, constituting
an expression of high ethical standards, is the principle of distinction, which
obligates military commanders to distinguish between military objectives and
civilian persons or objects. The practical application of this principle is
effectively encapsulated in Article 57 of Protocol I which, in part, obligates
those who plan or decide upon an attack to ‘do everything feasible to verify that
the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects.’ The
obligation to do everything feasible is high but not absolute. A military
commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and
evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must also
direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets
during operations. Both the commander and the aircrew actually engaged in
operations must have some range of discretion to determine which available
resources shall be used and how they shall be used. Further, a determination
that inadequate efforts have been made to distinguish between military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects should not necessarily focus
exclusively on a specific incident. If precautionary measures have worked
adequately in a very high percentage of cases then the fact they have not worked
well in a small number of cases does not necessarily mean they are generally
inadequate.19

Once again, it would seem that the committee was unwilling to find that
NATO might in fact have breached the law, even though it might be argued
that the decision not to suffer casualties and to fly beyond the range of
anti-aircraft artillery militated towards ineffective targeting, especially in
cloudy weather. Moreover, the number of incidents listed in the Report to the
prosecutor20 involving civilian casualties, some of which were quite heavy,
might suggest that the accuracy of targeting was inadequate in quite a large
number of cases.21

19. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, ¶¶ 28–9.
20. See id., ¶¶ 9 and 53.
21. See for example, id., ¶¶ 58–70, dealing with attacks on a civilian train and a convoy of
Albanian refugees.
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The Report to the Prosecutor went into some detail as to what might be defined as a military objective,22 but once again fails to be dogmatic as to the policy adopted by NATO. Perhaps more important in so far as the future is
concerned is its comments on proportionality, a concept that owes its origins
to ethical standards:
48. The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or not
it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively simple to
state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effect. For example, bombing a
refugee camp is obviously prohibited if its only military significance is that
people in the camp are knitting socks for soldiers. [Is the same true if they are
collecting aluminum pots to be converted into aircraft or munitions?]
Conversely, an air strike on an ammunition dump should not be prohibited
merely because a farmer is ploughing a field in the area. Unfortunately, most of
the applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so clear cut. It is
much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms than it
is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is often
between unlike quantities and values. One cannot easily assess the value of
innocent human lives as opposed to capturing a particular military objective.
49. The questions which remains unsolved once one decides to apply the
principle of proportionality include the following:
(a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage
gained and the injury to non-combatants and or the damage to civilian
objects?
(b) What do you include or exclude in totaling your sums?
(c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and
(d) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own
forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to
civilian objects? [Once again, an ethical question for said commander]
50. The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to resolve
them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the
background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a human rights
lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative
values to military advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is
unlikely that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and
22. See id., ¶¶ 35–47.
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differing degrees of combat experience or national military histories would
always agree in close cases. It is suggested that the determination of relative
values must be that of the ‘reasonable military commander’.23 Although there will
be room for argument in close cases, there will be many cases where reasonable
military commanders will agree that the injury to noncombatants or the damage
to civilian objects was clearly disproportionate to the military advantage
gained.24

Despite the somewhat confident expression to be found in this last sentence, the entire approach adopted in the Report to the Prosecutor emphasizes how difficult it will always be to reach an acceptable common
understanding of what constitutes ethical standards of behavior.
City planners rarely pay heed to the possibility of future warfare. Military
objectives are often located in intensely populated areas and fighting
occasionally occurs in such areas, Civilians present within or near military
objectives must, however, be taken into account in the proportionality equation
even if a party to the conflict has failed to exercise its obligation to remove
them.25
In the Kupreskic case the ICTY addressed the issue of proportionality as follows:
526. As an example of the way in which the Martens clause26 may be utilised,
regard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative effect of attacks
on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians. In other words,
it may happen that single attacks on military objectives causing incidental
damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as to their lawfulness,
nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul per se of the loose
prescriptions of Articles 57 and 5827 (or of the corresponding customary
rules). However, in case of repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within
the grey area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be
warranted to conclude that they may not be in keeping with international
law. Indeed, this pattern of military conduct may turn out to jeopardise
23. Emphasis added.
24. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A.
25. Id., ¶ 51
26. “[I]n cases not included in the Regulation . . . the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience.” Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 70 (emphasis added).
27. Protocol I, supra note 8, regarding “Precautionary Measures.”
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excessively the lives and assets of civilians, contrary to the demands of
humanity.’28
This formulation . . . can be regarded as a progressive statement of the applicable
law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians. Its practical import, is
somewhat ambiguous and its application far from clear. It is the committee’s
view where individual (and legitimate) attacks on military objectives are
concerned, the mere cumulation of such instances, all of which are deemed to
have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime. The committee
understands the above formulation, instead, to refer to an overall assessment of
the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign. . . .
54. During the bombing campaign, NATO aircraft flew 38,400 sorties,
including 10,484 strike sorties. During these sorties 23,614 munitions were
released . . . . [and] it appears that approximately 500 civilians were killed
during the campaign. These figures do not indicate that NATO may have
conducted a campaign aimed at causing substantial civilian casualties either
directly or incidentally.
55. The choice of targets by NATO includes some loosely defined categories
such as military-industrial infrastructure and government ministries and some
potential problem categories such as media and refineries. All targets must meet
the criteria for military objectives. If they do not do so, they are unlawful. A
general label is insufficient. The targeted components of the military-industrial
infrastructure and of government ministries must make an effective
contribution to military action and their total or partial destruction must offer a
definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. Refineries
are certainly traditional military objectives but tradition is not enough and due
regard must be paid to environmental damage if they are attacked. The media as
such is not a traditional target category. . . . As a bottom line, civilians, civilian
objects and civilian morale as such are not legitimate military objectives. The
media does have an effect on civilian morale. If that effect is merely to foster
support for the war effort, the media is not a legitimate military objective. If the
media is sued to incite crimes . . . it can become a legitimate military objective. If
the media is the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus
perpetuates the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate
military objective. As a general statement, in the particular incidents reviewed
by the committee, it is the view of the committee that NATO was attempting to
attack objects it perceived to be legitimate military objectives.

28. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Judgement, I.C.T.Y. No. IT-95-16-T, Jan. 14, 2000, ¶ 542.
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56. The committee agrees there is nothing inherently unlawful about flying
above the height which can be reached by enemy air defences. However,
NATO air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to distinguish
military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives. The 15,000 feet
minimum altitude adopted for part of the campaign may have meant the target
could not be verified with the naked eye. However, it appears that with the use
of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was effectively carried out
in the vast majority of cases during the bombing campaign.
57. In the course of its review, the committee did not come across any incident
which, in its opinion, required investigation by the OTP. . . .

The committee examined five specific incidents of attacks the legality of
which might have been doubtful, but in each case came to the conclusion that
there was no reason to refer the matter to the Prosecutor. One is left with a
somewhat uncomfortable feeling with the committee’s statement in its penultimate paragraph:
[T]he committee has not assessed any particular incidents as justifying the
commencement of an investigation by the OTP. NATO has admitted that
mistakes did occur during the bombing campaign; errors of judgment may also
have occurred. Selection of certain objectives for attack may be subject to legal
debate. On the basis of the information received, however, the committee is of
the opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the bombing
campaign as a whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are justified.
In all cases, either the law is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely
to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against
high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous offences.29

It may well be that, noting all the efforts to define proportionality and to assess
the role of ethical considerations, one comes to the conclusion that the findings
of the committee might be correct. However, it is submitted that one cannot but
feel that the report might have contributed more to vindicating the rule of law
and recognizing the significance of ethical standards as equally operative for all
parties, had it recommended to the Prosecutor the possibility of referring to the
ICTY some of the issues it examined. The Tribunal might not in all cases have
agreed with individual recommendations, particularly in view of the fact in
some instances the Report to the Prosecutor itself refers to a “trend
29. Report to the Prosecutor, Appendix A, ¶ 90.
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developing,” or to particular cases being controversial or—clearly an issue for
judicial determination—that in some instances “the law is not sufficiently
clear.”
The Serbs, particularly as a result of pressure from Russia, its traditional ally,
and in face of the threat by NATO that a land offensive would be launched, finally accepted terms almost identical with those rejected at Rambouillet prior
to the commencement of the bombing campaign. Among the terms accepted
was an arrangement for Kosovo to be temporarily administered by an international body supported by some military and police personnel brought in from
Yugoslavia, thus preserving that State’s concern with its national sovereignty.
Kosovo was divided into areas of administration with civil affairs to some extent controlled by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since it
was recognized that returning Kosovar Albanians, supported by the KLA,
might pursue a policy of revenge against the remaining Serb population, it was
agreed that the KLA would be disarmed and that KFOR would ensure the
safety of the Serbs. It was not long before it became clear that the KLA was not
going to be overly cooperative regarding the surrender of arms and KFOR not
excessively effective in preventing attacks on the Serbs.
Further, KLA leaders made it clear that they intended to regard themselves
as an interim government determined on secession, whatever the view of
NATO or KFOR. The French defense minister commented on this state of
affairs:
[T]here’s an unseemly scramble for power, influence and wealth within the
KLA. . . . The Kosovars don’t understand that we’re here not to support them
but to support human rights for all and ensure political power is held to account.
On the other hand, to expect the KLA to willingly disband when they see a
continued threat from paramilitaries under effective protection by French and
Russian troops [in their respective administrative areas], and to refuse to
recognize provisional mayors when UNMIK hasn’t assigned a single municipal
administrator, is just farcical.30

This seems to overlook that, officially at least, it was never part of NATO’s policy to assist the Kosovars in doing anything to question or endanger Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over the area. As the occupation by KFOR continued, it
became clear that, on paper at least, the KLA and its soi disant political leadership were proving a little more cooperative, although KFOR’s protective activities became more and more essential for the Serb population.
30. THE TIMES (London), Aug. 14, 1999.
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The growing willingness to allow the KLA—originally denounced as a gang
of terrorists—to push its political aims and failure to prevent attacks upon the
local Serbs raise questions as to the extent to which NATO was sustaining its
contention that its intervention was ethical based on the needs to protect humanitarian principles. In fact, the ethical and humanitarian character of
NATO’s policy became even more questionable when it reneged somewhat
on its promises to assist in the rehabilitation and rebuilding of Yugoslavia, unless the then government was replaced by one that was more “democratic.” It
is true that this has now ensued, but this fact does not lend support to the idealistic grounds on which NATO claims to have acted originally.
In assessing the validity of the NATO bombing campaign from both legal
and ethical standpoints, it becomes necessary to ask whether the campaign
achieved its purpose. That is to say, whatever its legality might have been, was
the action justified because of what was ultimately achieved? It is clear from
the above comments, and in the light of the continuing trouble in Kosovo and
the threats of conflict spreading in the area, that the writer is not happy with
either the legal or ethical grounds on which NATO claimed to be acting.
Since similar situations denying human rights in the most obscene manner
might recur, it is clearly necessary to consider what, if any, process can be introduced to prevent similar unilateral and questionable punitive or enforcement action in the future. Perhaps this might be achieved by adopting a policy
somewhat like the following:
When a government is unwilling or unable to protect, or persistently infringes
the human rights of large segments of its population, or the government
structure has so disintegrated that law and order have virtually ceased to exist, it
may then well be time for the United Nations to take over the administration
until such time as normal conditions have been restored. . . . To some extent this
is already happening in Bosnia and Kosovo. . . . However it would perhaps be
more desirable that this be done not on an ad hoc basis—nor by a group of states
assuming such authority unto itself—but on the basis of a permanent United
Nations body made up of trained personnel from a variety of countries. . . . The
members of such administrative or governing commissions should not be drawn
from nationals of the great powers among whom, despite the end of the cold
war, political rivalries and maneuvering is still likely to take place. 31
31. See Leslie Green, 23rd Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law,
1994 CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 6, 26; 26th Annual
Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, 1997 CANADIAN COUNCIL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 31, 37.
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Commentary
If such a policy were adopted, there might be less doubt as to the legal or
ethical basis for the intervention and a more substantial foundation for contending that it is in accordance with the rule of law and the maintenance of
ethical principles.
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